Abstract
I. Introduction
In February 2007, the US economy entered a period of steep financial retrenchment caused by a correction in the market for residential housing; a correction that has not yet run its full course. A key aspect of the housing correction is the unprecedented rise in the rate of residential mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures.
Figures 1 and 2 show delinquencies and foreclosures for mortgages of different types.
The rates are the highest in recent history. It is clear that subprime, adjustable-rate mortgages exhibit the worst performance and could be the greatest source of stress in the markets for Plan calls on lenders and servicers to voluntarily modify the mortgages of adjustable rate subprime borrowers before they go into default. The Plan attempts to reduce defaults by encouraging lenders and servicers to contact borrowers prior to the scheduled reset of their interest rate. In addition, the Paulson Plan temporarily freezes the introductory interest rate for a segment of the subprime borrowers for up to 5 years-leading some to label it the "teaser-freezer plan". Proponents of the Paulson Plan contend that a streamlined evaluation process for lenders and servicers will reduce transactions costs and increase the speed with which borrowers can be assisted and reduce the number of delinquencies and defaults.
The Paulson Plan has a second important objective. Many observers and key policymakers believe that the housing crisis poses a significant systemic risk to global financial markets. This risk is the result of rapidly declining home values and their effect on RMBS and other structured finance products whose values are derived from their underlying mortgage collateral. Our results show that the announcement of the Paulson Plan led to a temporary positive market reaction for select tranches and vintages of the ABX. At the announcement, investors in the ABX perceived that the Plan would materially improve the subprime housing market. These results were strongest in the most subordinate tranches of the ABX where loan modifications would be most likely to help. When we explore movements in the ABX in the six month period following the Paulson Plan, our findings suggest that any positive effects from Paulson Plan loan modifications were overwhelmed by the continued deterioration in housing markets. Consistent with the findings of other researchers who have studied the ABX [Dungey, Dwyer and Flavin (2008) and Fender and Scheicher (2008) ], we find that as the housing market deteriorates, the riskiness of all subprime securities increases, with a higher relative increase in riskiness for securities that are highly rated.
The paper is organized as follows: section two provides an overview of the types of mortgage modifications, the Paulson Plan and the benefits and costs of loan modifications.
Section three discusses the data and empirical approach, section four contains our results and section five concludes.
II. Types of mortgage modifications
One of the most common loan modifications extends the maturity of the mortgage.
Although the length of extension varies, it is not uncommon for borrowers to extend mortgages as many as 10 years beyond the existing maturity date. Mortgage extension can be beneficial to borrowers because it reduces their immediate financial burden by reducing monthly mortgage payments. However, many borrower advocacy groups view this type of modification unfavorably because it increases the overall financing cost of the home and lengthens the period of the borrower's indebtedness.
A more aggressive form of mortgage modification requires the lender to defer or forgive any missed payments. In the case of deferred interest payments, borrowers who have missed one or more payments would be allowed to stay in their homes, but any missed payment would be rolled into the principal of the loan. In most cases, the borrower is required to repay missed payments using a shortened amortization schedule. After the missed payments have been repaid, the payment returns to that established at origination. This form of modification is not popular among borrower advocate groups because deferring missed payments leads to an increase in mortgage payments. Increased mortgage payments to borrowers who may have had difficulty paying their mortgage under the original terms of the loan are unlikely to be an effective way to reduce mortgage defaults.
A type of modification popular with borrowers forgives missed interest and/or principal payments. Loans modified in this fashion allow the borrower to remain current on their mortgage without incurring any additional costs associated with missed payments. While this form of modification is most likely to have the greatest impact on reducing mortgage delinquency and default, this form of modification is not popular within the mortgage industry.
Another type of loan modification that is popular among borrowers forgives or reduces the principal/loan amount. Principal reduction is beneficial to the borrower because it allows the borrower to pay a lower monthly mortgage payment (both principal and interest). An additional benefit that is uniquely tied to the current housing crisis is that a principal reduction can be used to reduce the incentive of the borrowers to default on their mortgages and walk away from their homes. It has been well documented that the decline in home values has encouraged many borrowers to mail in their keys when their homes become worth less than their mortgage. Before the Paulson Plan could be initiated, adjustable rate subprime borrowers had to be segmented into groups in order to identify which borrowers would be eligible for the "Fast Track" Program. Group 1 borrowers are those that hold a subprime ARM and have the ability to refinance into a fixed rate mortgage product. The Paulson Plan encourages servicers who are in negotiations with borrowers that fall into this group to apply generally accepted industry standards for loan modifications or loss mitigation. In addition, the plan encourages servicers to waive prepayment penalties to help borrowers refinance into another mortgage product.
Group 2 borrowers are unlikely to be able to refinance into an alternative mortgage product, but they have met the following requirements: 5. They must be current, or at worst 30-days delinquent, and have no more than 1 60-day delinquency over the past 12 months; 6. They must occupy the property; 7. Their FICO score must be less than 660 and must not have increased more than 10% from the original FICO;
8. There must be no apparent fraud; 9. They cannot be eligible for FHA Secure loan program, which requires: a. the original loan-to-value ratio is greater than 97% on 1 st lien, b. or, they are otherwise ineligible because of delinquency history, a high debt-toincome ratio, or high outstanding loan balance.
Borrowers that fall into Group 2 are eligible for the rate freeze under the Paulson Plan.
The plan allows loans to be modified if the borrower agrees to the modification upon being contacted, or if the borrower makes two mortgage payments under the modified terms. Two criticisms were levied at the Paulson Plan when it was announced. First, because loan modifications represent a direct uncompensated cost to servicers, they might not aggressively contact, identify or modify loans to borrowers if it led to a significant increase in their costs. As a result, servicers might have fewer incentives to engage in activities that would lead to a reduction in foreclosures.
3 requirements were too strict compared to the number of borrowers in need of assistance, limiting its impact on foreclosures.
The benefits and costs of modifying mortgages
The Paulson Plan was intended to help borrowers stay in their homes, but the support of the securitization industry was necessary to ensure that the plan would be acceptable to investors in securitized products backed by subprime mortgages. Some of the investor incentives are quite transparent and are well aligned with the incentives of the homeowner. For example, a loan modification may increase the probability that the homeowner will retain the home; maintaining homeownership preserves the cash stream that flows to investors in securitized products. In addition to those direct benefits, loan modifications potentially prevent costs associated with foreclosure. From the investor's perspective, a loan that moves into foreclosure can expect a loss severity estimated at 40%-60%. In addition to the direct cost of foreclosure, investors may also incur costs if the borrower damages or neglects the property before being evicted.
The goal for loan modification is to reduce delinquencies and foreclosures, which will benefit borrowers, lenders, and investors. It is possible, however, that loan modifications may simply delay foreclosures. Historically, 30% to 50% of previously delinquent mortgages go into default within two years of being modified. 4, 5 to aggressively modify mortgages by providing servicers additional compensation for every year the homeowner remains current on their mortgage for up to five years.
Since the loans targeted by the Paulson Plan are in 4 Deutsche Bank, Jan. 2008. 5 The OCC reports that 37% of the mortgages modified in the first quarter of 2008 redefaulted after three months, and 53% did so after six months. If loan modifications simply delay the inevitable, then investors may find themselves in a weaker financial position if they allow mortgages to be modified. One concrete example of how this might occur concerns the release of excess spread. Excess spread is a form of credit enhancement that protects investors in the junior tranches against loss. Excess spread is a form of subordination that accumulates based on the difference between the income received from the securitized assets pool and the costs incurred by the trust (including payments to bondholders).
Typically, excess spread is highest early in a trust's life when the mortgage pool experiences very few losses. position, where they have received higher compensation for being at the bottom of the capital structure, but the default risk they bear has been reduced, increasing the cash flows they expect to receive.
For mezzanine tranche investors (e.g., BBB and A rated debt), loan modifications and the release of O/C may put them in a weaker credit position relative to subordinate debt holders.
The release of O/C and the potential delay in defaults puts these investors at risk of having to experience losses that would have been absorbed by subordinated investors in the absence of the plan.
III. Data and Methodology
To determine if the announcement of the Paulson Plan was viewed by the market as having a credible impact on reducing delinquencies and foreclosures among subprime homeowners requires a data source with inter-day variation. Variables, like delinquency or foreclosure rates, traditionally used to monitor the health of the housing market, are reported too infrequently for our purposes. As a result, we use data from the ABX index. The ABX, which is reported daily, is generally viewed as a barometer of the health of the subprime housing market. It is often said that "in a crisis, all correlations go to one." The graph presented in Figure   5 uses << Insert Figure 5 Here >>
The analysis used in this study is a variation of a traditional market model event study. 15 15 The model used for the purposes of this study is a variation of the Brown and Warner (1980) study used for equities and Asquith and Wizman (1990) and Warga and Welch (1993) , among others.
We use the market model to observe how the market perceived the potential success of the Paulson Plan. The model assumes that movements in returns on a reference portfolio that are different from the return movements in a control portfolio around a specific event can be attributed to the event. We observe the market's reaction to the Paulson Plan using daily ABX data for the time period July 10, 2007 to June 11, 2008. To ensure that observed movements in the ABX could be attributed to the Paulson Plan, we limit the sample to the period prior to the announcement of the first in a wave of additional loan modification plans, the FDIC's Mod-in-aBox Program to modify mortgages of the failed bank IndyMac (July 2008) . By starting the sample following a structural shift in the relationship between the AAA and BBB-tranches, we bias the market model against finding statistical significance around the event of interest.
For this study, the AAA tranche of the ABX index is used as the control group. We chose the AAA tranche for the control group because it represents the highest quality securities within the ABX index (the AAA tranche is protected by the most credit enhancements). In addition, its high quality ensures that while the AAA tranche is responsive to information related to the overall health of subprime housing, its movements will be less reflective of changes in asset credit quality when compared to subordinate tranches within the ABX index.
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To observe the market's assessment of the Paulson Plan, we must have a treatment portfolio that is influenced by information related to the health of the housing market, but more responsive to changes in credit quality than the control portfolio. The subordinated tranches to the AAA tranche in the ABX index are well suited for use as a treatment portfolio. We use the BBB-, BBB, A, and AA tranches of the ABX in our analysis.
The Paulson Plan strives to reduce the volatility in the cash flows from the subprime mortgage loans. Variations in the cash flows from these mortgages should have the greatest impact on the investors that hold securities in the subordinate and mezzanine tranches of the ABX. As a result, the price movements in the subordinate tranches within the ABX relative to 16 For the time period starting in the second half of 2005, Dungey, Dwyer and Flavin (2008) show that the standard deviation in returns is highest for those tranches that have the highest credit risk. In addition, the correlation between the AAA and BBB tranche ranges from 55.5% for the 06-1 vintage to 36.7% for the 07-2 vintage. The authors state that during the period of increased volatility in the ABX, the correlation between the tranches within each vintage increases leading investors to realize that they under-estimated the inherent risk of the most senior tranche. For our model, we explore the relationship between the AAA and BBB tranches by vintage. A high correlation between the two tranches would indicate that the AAA tranche is a good proxy for the market index in the market model when using subordinate tranches in the ABX as the reference variable. For the sample period used in this study, correlations are higher than those reported in Dungey, Dwyer and Flavin (2008) , ranging from 62.9% for the 06-1 vintage to 43.1% for the 07-2 vintage. Correlations using the Standard and Poor's 500 (S&P 500) as an alternative proxy to the AAA index of the ABX are also explored. For the sample period, the relationship between the S&P 500 and the BBB tranche of the ABX ranges from 29.3% for the 06-1 vintage to 22.3% for the 07-2 vintage. In every case, the correlations between the S&P 500 and the subordinate tranches of the ABX are significantly lower when compared to the AAA index of the ABX.
the AAA tranche of the ABX can provide information about how the market perceives the Paulson Plan's ability to reduce delinquencies and foreclosures. In addition, the results from the model could inform us as to which asset risk classes are most likely to benefit from the Plan. If the Plan is viewed as being beneficial to homeowners and investors in specific risk classes, then the corresponding tranches in the ABX should experience positive price movements.
Aside from tranching based on risk levels, the ABX is also differentiated based on vintage. For each vintage of the index, the mortgage assets that make up the ABX are originated a half-year prior to the stated calendar year/portion of the year on the index. Our ability to observe differential investor responses by vintage is significant because underwriting standards were relaxed over time, thereby leading to a larger benefit from modifying loans. The data used in this study allows us to evaluate the market's perception of the potential beneficiaries of the Paulson Plan on two important dimensions: asset quality and time.
We also include the three-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) as an explanatory variable in the market model. Fender and Scheicher (2008) 
IV. Results
Overall, our results provide limited evidence that investors in the ABX viewed the announcement that the Paulson Plan would initiate loan modifications for a segment of subprime borrowers that were at risk of default as a positive event. Loan modifications are beneficial for they allow investors to extend their claim to the cash flows remitted to investors by homeowners meeting the contractual terms of their mortgage. However, there appears to be distinct investor groups that benefit from the Plan's announcement. These results indicate that the most subordinate tranches of the ABX benefit the most from the Paulson announcement. These tranches would be most likely to have experienced significant losses associated with delinquencies and foreclosures in the residential mortgage market. The results also indicate that there is a relationship between credit quality and the size of the pool of potential homeowners that are eligible to receive mortgage modifications influences which investor groups benefit from the Plan.
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<< Insert Table 1 Here >>
The main results from the market model are shown in Table 1 Table 1 show that 18 Analysts of the subprime crisis have observed that that the underwriting standards used by mortgage lenders were increasingly more flexible over time. As a result, the 07-2 vintage of the ABX may have a higher percentage of loans that would qualify for modification under the Plan. It is also likely that the lax underwriting standards may lead to losses of principal further up the credit ladder. Deutsche Bank (November 2007) notes that "a large segment of the marketplace has now come to accept that collateral performance is likely to be sufficiently poor that many (if not most) BBB-and BBB bonds (and potentially many bonds rated A or higher) are in danger of suffering severe principal losses." were mispriced the most at origination and that in the time span we study, risk was transferred up the capital structure from lower-to higher rated tranches. To explore a potential shift in the return structure of the ABX following the failure of Bear Stearns, a shift that led to a change in the relative risk relationship between the AAA and the subordinate tranches of the ABX, we need to control for the possibility that the relationship between our control index AAA and the dependent variables are not constant over our sample.
As a result, we attempt to account for a relative change in the risk-relationship between AAA and subordinate tranches by including a dummy variable taking value zero before March 10, 2008 and 1 after, as well as an interaction term between this dummy variable and the AAA index.
To explore this relationship, we introduce an interaction term that is created using the AAA index of the ABX and a corresponding dummy variable (labeled "Bear Stearns") into the empirical model. The interaction term uses a dummy variable that corresponds to the time period following the structural break in the ABX. As in the previous model, the AAA index of the ABX is also used as a control variable in the model. It is important to explore this long-term relationship because during this period it became clear that housing markets continued to deteriorate. In addition to the Bear Stearns variable, the Paulson dummy variable from table 1 is also included in the model. Table 2 Here >> 
<< Insert

V. Conclusion
The Paulson Plan was initiated to provide relief to subprime housing market, with particular emphasis on adjustable-rate borrowers who were facing higher mortgage payments after the introductory interest rate on their mortgage reset. The motivation behind the Plan was the belief that subprime mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures could be reduced by outreach to eligible borrowers and by freezing the introductory interest rate on mortgages for five years.
We employ an empirical strategy similar to an event study model where data from the 
